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Article 8

Abrams: Responses to the Five Questions

RESPONSES TO THE FIVE QUESTIONS
Norman Abramst
TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11, WHAT IS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT LEGACY
LEFT BY THE TERRORIST ATTACKS? ARE WE SAFER?

1.

Ten years after 9/11, the most significant legacy(ies) of those
terrorist attacks fall under three headings: (a) the public's everpresent awareness that we continue to be vulnerable to terrorism,
even a catastrophic terrorist attack; (b) the significant security
apparatus and enforcement measures that have been implemented
since 9/11; and (c) the fact that national security became, and
continues to be, a central political issue and governmental
concern.
The public's awarenessof the risk of a terroism attack and its
L
implications.
Generally, in the ten years since 9/11, the public has displayed
a remarkable degree of cooperativeness and willingness to undergo
inconvenience in connection with security measures that impact
directly on them (e.g., airport security). Occasionally, of course,
impatience surfaces when the security measures seem to be
unreasonable ways of preventing terrorism.
An important concern is that, as the period lengthens in which
a successful major terrorist attack has not occurred, it becomes
harder to maintain the needed, ever-present vigilance. Our ability
to continue to apply the necessary degree of care in security steps
weakens. The need to fight apathy and to try to keep our guard up
against the risk of terrorism is also part of the legacy of 9/11.
Another feature of this legacy of 9/11 is the general public's
seeming tolerance of governmental measures that do not directly
impact most people and that are perceived as necessary actions to
prevent terrorism. In the court of public opinion, unlike civil
libertarians, the general public has not seemed especially upset
f
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when the government has taken somewhat draconian steps in the
name of national security. For example, the public may be
unaware or simply unconcerned about moves that some members
of Congress have made to shift the custody and prosecution of
more persons accused of terrorism into military jurisdiction.
II. The significant security apparatusthat has been created and the
enforcement measures that have been implemented.
Other features of the post-9/11 legacy include the following:
(1) large numbers of federal and state personnel that are now
devoted to anti-terrorist investigatory and prosecutorial activities
(e.g., in the FBI and the Department of Justice); (2) new legal
measures, processes, and procedures that have been developed to
deal with terrorist-related matters, some pre-dating 9/11; and (3)
increased attention that has been devoted to practical security
measures-guarding infrastructure, public and private buildings,
nuclear facilities, airports, dams, reservoirs, factories, etc. Training
in security, and courses in security and security-related professions
and disciplines have become new cottage industries.
III. National security as a politicalconcern and politicalissue.
Another byproduct of 9/11 is that, even ten years later,
national security is, and will continue to be, near the top of the list
of political issues addressed by candidates for public office and an
important concern in Congress. This is not a bad thing. The
problem is that in regard to police/security-type issues, it is
politically risky to allow oneself to be out-flanked by opponents on
the right. As a result, political figures, especially on the national
scene, tend to drift rightward in their views on national security
issues. One finds few officeholders or candidates who espouse
strong civil liberties perspectives. This is not a new phenomenon,
but, arguably, it has become more pronounced since 9/11.
IV Are we safer?
Safer-what is safer? At best it is a relative term. Safer than we
would have been without the measures that have been taken? I
would say "yes." If not, then all that has been done in the name of
national security in the decade since 9/11 would seem to have gone
for naught. Of course, while on one level the country is somewhat
better protected than it was in 2001, it can also be argued that we

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss5/8

2

Abrams: Responses to the Five Questions

2012]

FIVE QUESTIONS: ABRAMS

1599

have antagonized people in other countries and some foreign
governments by some of the measures that have been taken. As a
consequence, we have created additional antagonists and, possibly,
enemies, a fact that ultimately may affect our safety.
In fact, it is impossible to answer this question in a meaningful
way except by highlighting the obvious factors that should enter
into an assessment of our relative safety since 9/11. If the
implication of the question is that perhaps it was wasteful or
counterproductive to undertake the various security steps that have
been taken in the wake of 9/11, since on one scale or another we
are still at risk, I would strongly disagree with that implication.
First, these measures-e.g., the apprehension and prosecution of
individuals who have been plotting or preparing for terrorist acts
and the various security measures that have been implementedhave had an effect on our safety, even if it is impossible to measure.
Second, a government must respond to the felt needs of the people
and circumstances and must also appear to be doing so if it is to
continue to receive the support of the populace.
Of course, questions can be raised about whether all of the
steps that have been taken were the right ones. But that suggestion
raises a different and quite complicated set of issues that go beyond
the confines of this paper. While there have been some mistakes,
for the most part the government has acted in a reasonable
fashion, though sometimes the process by which decisions were
made, particularly in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, was skewed.
2.

WHAT IMPACT WILL THE "ARAB SPRING" HAVE ON AMERICAN
NATIONAL SECURITY?

"Arab Spring" means the changes in governments that have
occurred, and may yet still occur, as a result of massive protests by
the populace in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen,
and Syria. Because these events are still occurring and the
resulting changes in government are still very uncertain, at best,
predictions about the impact on U.S. national security must be very
speculative.
The direction of changes resulting from the Arab Spring
protests has been toward trying to hold fair democratic elections
that would lead to new governments replacing the essentially
autocratic/dictatorial government systems previously in place. Of
course, democratic elections may produce new governments that
are not particularly friendly to the United States; elections may also
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result in governments that are religiously-based; and finally, they
can lead to governments, which, once elected and in power, may
not maintain the commitment to democratic elections in the
future. Democracy may be the best system, but its essential
characteristic is that, in fair elections, no one can control
outcomes.

The Obama Administration has generally supported the Arab
Spring changes despite all U.S. administrations having previously
had close relationships with governments such as the Mubarak rule
in Egypt. Of course, our support of the Arab Spring movements
may have in part reflected a desire to be on the right side of
popular uprisings that could not be stopped anyway. We can try to
previous friendly
and continue
developments
influence
relationships and alignments with the new Arab governments
through the careful use of the traditional tools of foreign policy.
These include, for example, the provision of substantial foreign
aid, military assistance, and economic help to the countries at issue,
as well as maintenance of pre-existing relationships with key
individuals, some of whom may have been educated or received
training in the United States. But despite our best diplomatic
efforts, we may find the new governments aligning themselves with
our adversaries (e.g., Iran) or replacing former close association

with the United States with a policy of non-alignment.
Will any such changes directly affect American national
security? Ultimately, the Middle East is a key geographic and
political area for our national security. The general political
significance of this area, combined with the fact that it is a major
source of oil for the United States, Europe, and other important
parts of the world, and the fact that one dangerous Middle East
nation may soon become a nuclear power, make these
unpredictable changes in alignments and relationships with other
nations a matter of national security concern.
A period of uncertainty regarding the results of the Arab
Spring lies ahead of us. No one can tell today whether it will
impact national security in any significant or negative way and, if
so, to what extent. But the potential is there for major changes. At
a minimum, it behooves the United States to maintain a nimble
foreign policy in the Middle East, guided by a careful, nuanced
assessment as to what U.S. actions or inactions will best serve vital
U.S. interests.
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3. WHAT LESSONS CAN BE LEARNED FROM THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION'S HANDLING OF THE AHMED WARSAME CASE?
A number of significant issues are posed by the Obama
Administration's handling of the Warsame case.' The focus here
will be only on the issues arising out of Warsame's detention for
more than two months in military custody on shipboard and being
interrogated there, and his subsequent transfer to civilian custody,
and further interrogation by FBI agents after being given Miranda
warnings.
Detaining Warsame on shipboard during the first period of
interrogation was the administration's way of holding him in
military custody for a period of time without sending him to
Guantanamo or a military facility on the mainland. Because the
administration is trying to close the Guantanamo detention facility,
it avoids sending any new detainees there. Meanwhile, Congress
has acted to prevent sending any new detainees to any military
detention facility in the United States.
The shipboard option worked well in the case of Warsame
because, at the end of the two months or so of interrogation, the
government decided to shift him to civilian custody and prosecute
Suppose, however, that rather than
him in federal court.
prosecuting him, the government had decided to keep him in
military detention as long as the war against al Qaeda continued
because there was not enough admissible evidence to convict him.
In such a circumstance, unless the impasse between the
administration and Congress regarding what to do with detainees
can be resolved, where would the government indefinitely detain
1. Ahmed Warsame was a Somali seized from a fishing boat sailing between
Somalia and Yemen in April 2011. He was treated as a military prisoner and
accused of aiding al Qaeda's branch in Yemen and al Shabaab, a Somali militant
group. He was taken to a U.S. navy ship and interrogated there for two months by
a special team of interrogators from several agencies. After a break of several days,
during which he was allowed to see a Red Cross representative, the questioning
was resumed by FBI agents, and he was given Miranda warnings. See Charlie
Savage, U.S. Tests New Approach to Terrorism Cases on Somali Suspect, N.Y. TIMES (July
6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/07/world/africa/07detain.html?-r
=1.
2. See National Defense Authorization Act for 2012, H.R. Res. 1540, 112th
Cong. §§ 1026-27 (1st Sess. 2012) (enacted) (prohibiting the use of funds for the
transfer of prisoners from Guantanamo or for the construction or modification of
prison facilities in the United States to house prisoners transferred from
Guantanamo). These provisions repeat similar provisions contained in the NDAA
for the previous year.
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him? On shipboard? It is a disturbing idea with bad associations,
calling to mind the notorious British prison ships from the period
of the American Revolution.
By treating Warsame as a military detainee for a period of
months, the government was able to gain the advantage of a period
of very extended interrogation that likely would not have been
available if he had originally been treated as a civilian arrested on
criminal charges.
In the latter circumstance, the normally
applicable rules would have required that prior to any
interrogation he be given the Miranda warnings, and, unless he
waived his Miranda rights, the interrogation would not have taken
place; he would have been brought before a magistrate "without
unnecessary delay,"' at which time he would have an opportunity to
consult with counsel. The tactical gain arising out of the way the
government handled the case is considerable: the possibility of a
very time-limited period of interrogation versus a time frame of two
months or more.
Ahmed Warsame is not the first person held in military
detention for an extended period and subsequently shifted to
civilian custody and prosecuted in federal court. Other examples
include Jose Padilla and Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, both of whom
were detained for a period of years, interrogated during the period
of extended detention, and then shifted to the civilian legal system
for prosecution. What arguably differentiates the Warsame case is
the fact that, unlike Padilla and al-Marri, where the government
appeared to have backed into the sequence of military detention
followed by civilian prosecution, for Warsame, it seems to have
been a calculated progression. Even if not the case, the lesson that
the government will take away from this handling of the case-if it
passes muster in the courts-undoubtedly will be that this is an
advantageous way to proceed.
It may be contended, however, that the advantage to the
government is strategic (the purpose of the initial, lengthy period
of questioning was to obtain intelligence useful for preventing
terrorist actions), not tactical (i.e., not for the purpose of obtaining
evidence to prosecute the individual). Whether that distinction
carries the day may turn on the weight given to a statement in the
plurality opinion of the Supreme Court in Missouri v. Siebert-Y4

3.
4.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.
542 U.S. 600 (2004).
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"Upon hearing warnings only in the aftermath of interrogation and
just after making a confession, a suspect would hardly think he had
a genuine right to remain silent .... .
Whether the Warsame approach ultimately is upheld by the
courts will depend on how well that approach fits within the overall
guidelines set by the Siebert decision. That case also involved a twostep strategy, but the earlier stage, of course, was not a period of
military detention. Siebert suggests that the issue will depend on
how effective a separation the government achieves between the
two periods of interrogation. Because the principal opinion in
Siebert commanded the views of only a four-justice plurality, Justice
Kennedy's opinion, concurring in the judgment, has usually been
cited as decisive since it represented views on which five justices
could agree:
When an interrogator uses [a] deliberate, two-step
strategy, predicated upon violating Miranda during an
extended interview, postwarning statements that are
related to the substance of prewarning statements must be
excluded

absent specific,

curative

steps..

.

. Curative

measures should be designed to ensure that a reasonable
person in the suspect's situation would understand the
import and effect of the Miranda warning and of the
Mirandawaiver. For example, a substantial break in time
and circumstances between the prewarning statement and
the Mirandawarning may suffice in most circumstances, as
it allows the accused to distinguish the two contexts and
6
appreciate that the interrogation has taken a new turn.
The government in the Warsame situation took the Siebert
approach to heart and applied significant "curative measures."
Warsame was first interrogated by the recently created High Value
Interrogation Group, made up of FBI, CIA, and Defense
Department personnel, over a period of more than two months on
almost a daily basis. Prior to, and during this period, he was not
given Mirandawarnings.7 Subsequently there was a break of several
days; during this break, Warsame was permitted to meet with a Red

5. Id. at 613 (Souter,J., concurring).
6. Id. at 621-22.
7. Note that Section 1040 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2010
prohibited the giving of Miranda warnings to a foreign national detained outside
the United States as an enemy belligerent in the custody of the Department of
Defense and being interrogated by military or components of the intelligence
community. H.R. 2647, 111th Cong. § 1040 (1stSess. 2009).
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Cross representative. When the interrogation resumed, it was
conducted by FBI agents (i.e., a different group of interrogators),
and he was given Mirandawarnings.
The government is betting that the combination of a break of
several days, a different set of interrogators, a different purpose for
the interrogation, and the opportunity meanwhile to meet with an
outside person are sufficiently curative to make admissible any
statements Warsame made during the post-Miranda-warnings
interrogation by FBI agents.
To be compared with the Warsame interrogation approach is
that contemplated under the recently adopted FBI guidelines
regarding interrogation of terrorist suspects arrested in the United
States;9 in and because of exigent circumstances, Mirandawarnings
are not required. When the interrogation reaches a point where
the interrogators are no longer seeking intelligence in exigent
circumstances, it may nevertheless be continued if deemed useful,
on the assumption that the statements obtained from that point
forward will not be admissible in a criminal prosecution of that
suspect. Under the Warsame two-step protocol, which was applied
to persons captured outside of the United States, the government
apparently assumes that statements from the first interrogation
relating to intelligence gathering would not be admissible in the
criminal prosecution of the suspect in federal court. Under the
somewhat different two-step process contemplated by the FBI
guidelines, statements from the first portion of the interrogation
justified by exigent circumstances would be admissible in the
criminal prosecution, but statements obtained from the latter
portion of the interrogation, post-exigency, again are assumed to
The two approaches may be viewed as
be inadmissible.
complementary, each usable in the appropriate circumstance.
Another potential challenge to the legal success of the
Warsame two-step protocol arises out of the fact that, reportedly,
the interrogators in the first stage of the interrogation used only
8. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, Accused al Shabaab Leader
Charged with Providing Material Support to al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (July 5, 2011), availableat http://wwwjustice.gov/usao/nys
/pressreleases/Julyll /warsameindictmentpr.pdf.
9. Internal Memorandum, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Custodial Interrogation for Public Safety and Intelligence-Gathering
Purposes of Operational Terrorists Arrested Inside the United States (Oct. 21,
2010), in FBI. Memorandum, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com
/2011/03/25/us/25iniranda-text.html.
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techniques approved under the Army Field Manual (AFM). The
AFM bars the use of extreme and harsh methods of interrogation,
but some methods authorized under the AFM may be deemed
coercive under relevant Supreme Court case law. As noted, the
two-step protocol assumes that statements obtained in the first
interrogation stage would not be offered into evidence in the
criminal trial of the suspect, so even if unlawful "coercion" was used
in obtaining them, their admissibility is not at issue. The question
can be posed, however, that if coercive methods were used in the
first-stage interrogation, might these affect the admissibility of
The
statements obtained in the second-stage interrogation?
government's likely response would invoke the same general type
of curative-measures approach used to address the failure to give
Miranda warnings in the first-stage interrogation. The Supreme
10
Court addressed a somewhat similar issue in Lyons v. Oklahoma":
Here improper methods were used to obtain a confession,
but that confession was not used at the trial. Later, in
another place and with different persons present, the
accused again told the facts of the crime. Involuntary
confessions, of course, may be given either simultaneously
with or subsequently to unlawful pressures, force or
threats. The question of whether those confessions
subsequently given are themselves voluntary depends on
the inferences as to the continuing effect of the coercive
practices which may fairly be drawn from the surrounding
circumstances.'
The Warsame case could turn out to be a watershed precedent
on how the government will handle the detention, interrogation,
and prosecution of terrorists captured abroad. Whether the
precedent might be usable for alleged terrorists apprehended in
the United States is an issue fraught with even more controversy
than the questions addressed here. If the government wins its bet
and courts uphold the Warsame manner of proceeding, it will have
in hand a two-step interrogation protocol usable in any terrorism
case where there are adequate grounds for treating suspects, at
least at the outset, as military detainees. Arguably, it could function
as an end-run around the strictures and consequences of the
Miranda warnings and the requirement of prompt first appearance
before a magistrate, as well as a way of repairing the legal damage
10.

322 U.S. 596 (1944).

11.

Id. at 602.
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done by the use of mildly coercive interrogation methods in a firststage interrogation.
4.

OF ALL THE THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY, WHICH TYPE IS THE
UNITED STATES LEAST PREPARED TO HANDLE? WHERE IS THE UNITED
STATES MOST VULNERABLE TO ATTACK?

This may be a very unwise question to ask. Why should a
country or its terrorism experts advertise our weaknesses and spots
where we are most vulnerable to attack? No matter-the expertise
which we possess on this issue does not go much beyond what a
reasonably intelligent person could derive from newspapers and
other media sources. Terrorists certainly read, too.
The threat of most concern is from persons living in the
United States for a long time, possibly citizens, who become
radicalized and operational members of a terrorist network or
dangerous lone wolves. It is a big country, and we are not really
equipped to keep track of even the small portion of our population
who might pose such a risk since we may not know who fits into
that category.
Other vulnerabilities include crucial elements of our
infrastructure-e.g., electronic communications, nuclear facilities,
factories, dams and reservoirs, ports, and incoming shipments by
land, sea, and air. Clearly, we have moved in the direction of
hardening and protecting these targets, but the task is difficult, and
we are not as far along as we would like to be.
5.

WHAT FACTORS WILL HELP DETERMINE WHETHER AL QAEDA HAS
BEEN DEFEATED?

Al Qaeda is a nonstate actor, a terrorist organization that,
today, is a set of subgroups, loosely affiliated and operating in
different countries and, probably, not under a significant degree of
hierarchical control from its "leadership." We have killed its
supreme leader, Osama Bin Laden, who was its principal
ideological and strategic thinker, as well as other lesser members of
its leadership group. But the organization continues to operate
under other leadership.
How does one determine that a nonstate actor terrorist
organization has been defeated? There is no prospect-as there is
when fighting a war with a state-actor enemy-of a formal
surrender, an overrunning of the territory of the enemy, or
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conquering and even killing all or even most of the membership of
the organization. The organization is too spread out in its loosely
affiliated subgroups to lend itself to those kinds of defeats.
At best, the hope is to continue to apprehend or kill members
of this terrorist organization and its leaders-to defeat al Qaeda by
attrition; to weaken it to the point where it is no longer an effective
terrorist force and no longer poses a significant risk to U.S.
interests; where in a best case scenario, it simply fades away. But
that is unlikely to be a defined point in time. We may, however,
reach a point where the government feels comfortable "declaring
victory." Or we may not. The "war" could conceivably continue
indefinitely at a low level.
An implicit premise of the question may be that if al Qaeda is
defeated, the end of our "war" on terror will be at hand-therefore
determining whether and when that eventuality occurs would be an
important milestone. But if the threat to the United States is
perceived as linked to international terrorism, of which al Qaeda is
only one, albeit currently, the most dangerous manifestation, the
better question may be: "[W]hen will international terrorism be
defeated?" But that question carries with it its own answer. The
threat to the United States from international terrorism, even more
than the threat from al Qaeda, is not likely to end in the
foreseeable future.
Recently, an effort was made in Congress to broaden the scope
of the legal basis for our actions against al Qaeda by passing the
Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF), a oint resolution
The AUMF
passed by Congress on September 18, 2001.'
authorizes the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
A
authorized, committed, or aided' the 9/11 terrorist attacks.1

provision passed by the House of Representatives in Summer 2011
for inclusion in the National Defense Authorization Bill for 2012
would have redefined the scope of the current armed conflict to
include "nations, organizations and persons who-are part of or are
substantiallysupporting the al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associatedforces that
are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition

partners."

The Obama Administration strongly objected to this

12. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 50 U.S.C. § 1541, 115 Stat. 224.
13. Id. Sec. 2(a) (emphasis added).
14. H.R. 1540, 112th Cong. § 1034 (1st Sess. 2012) (enacted) (emphasis
added).
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recharacterization of the conflict on the ground that it "would risk
creating confusion regarding applicable standards. At a minimum,
this is an issue that merits more extensive consideration before
possible inclusion."'
The final version of the NDAA for 2012,
which was signed by the President on December 31, 2011,
contained essentially the same language, not as a redefinition of
the conflict but rather as the definition of "covered persons" who
under the AUMF may be detained pending disposition under the
law of war. 16
The recounting of this recent legislative back and forth is
notable for what was not at issue. The legislation deals with the
legal authority of the government to capture and detain individuals
with specified links to al Qaeda-those who had been, or would be,
apprehended in the future while the struggle against al Qaeda
continues.
The resulting legislation clarifies and, arguably,
broadens that authority. The immediate significance of the new
language may be its effect on habeas corpus litigation involving
detainees.
Depending on the meaning given to the phrase
"associated forces," terrorists can be apprehended and detained if
they substantially support or are at least part of "forces"
"associated" with al Qaeda or the Taliban and engaged in hostilities
against the United States or its coalition partners. What was not at
issue in Congress was whether the government has the authority to
engage international terrorism that threatens U.S. interests
wherever it can be found, even if it has no connection at all to al
Qaeda or the Taliban. In this age of nuclear, biological, and
chemical weaponry, a new international terrorist organization
could spring up and, conceivably, pose a threat of catastrophic
danger to the United States.
Such a development suggests
questions about the adequacy of the existing foundation for the
government's exercise of legal authority to act abroad and in a
military mode against terrorists. This authority is currently linked
to al Qaeda and its associates. A difficult challenge would be posed
in such a post-al Qaeda period if a specific named new "enemy" has
not been identified. The AUMF, which was the rough equivalent of
a declaration of war, while nontraditional in not naming a nation
15. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF
ADMINISTRATION POLICY ON HR 1540 - NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION AcT FOR
FY2012 2 (May 24, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default
/files/omb/legislative/sap/ 112/saphrl 540r_20110524.pdf.
16. SeeH.R. 1540, 112th Cong. § 1021 (1st Sess. 2012).
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state as the enemy, at least focused the target by relating the scope
of the authorization to those who had been involved in the 9/11
attacks.
Without the naming of a specific adversary or some other
method for narrowing the scope of this type of authorization, is it
legally feasible to issue a declaration like the AUMF? Would it be
wise to give the executive branch a roving commission to attack
terrorist enemies of the United States wherever they are found and
are deemed to be sufficiently threatening to U.S. interests? Such a
declaration would be objectionable since it would amount to giving
a blank check authority to the executive branch to act abroad in a
military mode.
Arguments can nevertheless be made for why it is desirable to
give an administration some flexible tools to deal with new
significant international terrorist threats whenever they arise. The
challenge is how to accomplish that result without raising serious
concerns about the risks of giving the executive an unfettered
authority to commit U.S. military resources abroad. For the
present, it may be best to defer such questions on the ground that
we have enough on our plate; there will be time enough to address
such issues if and when we reach a point where it can fairly be said
that al Qaeda has been defeated. We are not yet there.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012

13

